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publication costs for indigents necessitates a definitive Court of Ap-
peals decision or legislation. Moreover, the Legislature should spe-
cifically authorize the use of expedient service under CPLR 308(5)
in matrimonial actions, so that the onerous costs of service by pub-
lication can be avoided. "'hy .... in a matrimonial action, should
a plaintiff unable to effect personal service be forced to bear the ex-
pense of publication?"58
ARTCLE 21 - PAPEmRS
CPLR 2104: Oral settlement reached at informal conference in judge's
chambers held not made in open court.
CPLR 2104 requires agreements between parties relating to mat-
ters in an action to be in writing and subscribed, except when such
agreements are made between counsel in "open court." Some courts
have held that a stipulation of settlement is not an agreement relating
to a matter "in an action" within the meaning of the statute, 0 al-
though the opposite view is more widely held.60 A second unsettled
issue has been whether the term "open court" includes informal pro-
ceedings in the judge's chambers.61 The Court of Appeals, in In re
Dolgin Eldert Corp.,62 resolved both issues.
In Dolgin, an intrafamily dispute arose over jointly-owned prop-
58 The Quarterly Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 768, 781 (1972).
59 See Langlois v. Langlois, 5 App. Div. 2d 75, 169 N.Y.S.2d 170 (3d Dep't 1957) (per
curiam); Lloyd v. R.S.M. Corp., 225 App. Div. 85, 232 N.Y.S. 290 (Ist Dep't 1928), rev'd
on other grounds, 251 N.Y. 318, 167 N.E. 456 (1929); Smith v. Bach, 82 App. Div. 608,
81 N.Y.S. 1057 (2d Dep't 1903); In re Estate of Sakel, 31 Misc. 2d 791, 220 N.Y.S2d 688
(Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1961); In re Gardiner, 204 Misc. 884, 126 N.Y.S.2d 121 (Sur. Ct.
N.Y. County 1953); Lee v. Rudd, 120 Misc. 407, 198 N.Y.S. 628 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1923). See also 7B McKiNNv's CPLR 2104, commentary at 672 (1970).
60 See Solins v. Klosky, 8 App. Div. 2d 848, 190 N.Y.S.2d 633 (2d Dep't 1959) (meau.);
Anders v. Anders, 6 App. Div. 2d 440, 179 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1st Dep't 1958); Ariel v. Ariel,
5 App. Div. 2d 168, 171 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1st Dep't 1958) (per curiam); Cook v. Bianco, 226
App. Div. 691, 233 N.Y.S. 729 (2d Dep't 1929); Macrina v. Macrina, 78 N.Y.S.2d 244
(Sup. Ct. Herkimer County 1947). See generally 2 CATRaODV-WArr 2d, § 7:7, at 13-14
(1965); 2A WK&:M 2104.03.
61 For cases holding that the term "open court" does not include informal proceedings
in the judge's chambers, see People ex rel. Putziger v. Putziger, 22 App. Div. 2d 821, 254
N.Y.S.2d 916 (2d Dep't 1964) (meri.); Rosen v. Grand, 6 App. Div. 2d 799, 175 N.Y.S.2d
441 (2d Dep't 1958) (mee.); Accarino v. Hirsch, 6 App. Div. 2d 795, 175 N.Y..2d 435
(2d Dep't 1958) (mem.); Brozyna v. Andreski, 6 App. Div. 2d 601, 179 N.Y.S.2d 945 (3d
Dep't 1958). For the contrary view, see Gass v. Arons, 131 Misc. 502, 227 N.Y.S. 282
(N.Y. City Ct. Bronx County 1928). Cf. Golden Arrow Films, Inc. v. Standard Club of Cal.,
Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 813, 328 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1st Dep't) (mem.), motion for leave to appeal
granted, 30 N.Y.2d 486, 286 N.E.2d 926, 335 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1972), discussed in The Quar-
terly Survey, 47 ST. JOHN'S REv. 148, 164 (1972) (holding that there was substantial compli-
ance with CPLR 2104 when an uncontested settlement was recorded by justice in
chambers); Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Dinan, 42 Misc. 2d 595, 598, 248 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964) (dictum).
6231 N.Y.2d 1, 286 N.E.2d 228, 334 N.Y.S.2d 833, rev'g 38 App. Div. 2d 554, 328
N.Y.S.2d 384 (2d Dep't 1972).
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erties. One branch of the family sued for an accounting and dis-
solution of close corporations, while the other demanded specific
performance of an alleged agreement for a specific division of the
properties. The actions were consolidated and a pretrial hearing was
held in the Supreme Court, Kings County. Initially, the parties dis-
cussed the matter with the clerk at special term; they then conferred
with the presiding justice in his chambers. No stenographer was pres-
ent, and no record was kept. It appeared that an agreement had been
reached, and the justice requested the parties to prepare written
stipulations of settlement. The stipulations submitted were contradic-
tory: one provided for an accounting; the other did not. The parties
then appeared in a formally recorded proceeding before the presid-
ing justice, at which it became apparent that an accounting had been
discussed with the clerk, but had not been mentioned in the justice's
chambers. The court then held that no accounting had been provided
for, and decided that the respondents' stipulation should be enforced.
The Appellate Division, Second Department, affirmed.
The Court of Appeals unanimously reversed, holding that while
CPLR 2104 is applicable to stipulations of settlements, the proceed-
ings therein did not qualify under the statutory exception. "[T]he
open court exception," stated the Court, ". ..does not extend to a
conference in a Judge's chambers, even in these days of judicial in-
tervention in settlement negotiations."6 The Court was clearly influ-
enced by its finding that no agreement had actually been reached
between the parties,64 for it emphasized that the limited but neces-
sary exception to CPLR 2104 should not be extended, especially where,
as in this case, issues of fact and credibility are generated, a situation
which is detrimental not only to the litigation itself but also to the
dignity of the court.65 In the absence of a proven agreement in "open
63 31 N.Y.2d at 9-10, 286 N.E2d at 233, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 840, citing People ex rel
Putziger v. Putziger, 22 App. Div. 2d 821, 254 N.Y.S.2d 916 (2d Dep't 1964) (mem.);
Rosen v. Grand, 6 App. Div. 2d 799, 175 N.YS.2d 441 (2d Dep't 1958) (mem.); Accarino
v. Hirsch, 6 App. Div. 2d 795, 175 N.Y.S.2d 435 (2d Dep't 1958) (mem.); Brozyna v.
Andreski, 6 App. Div. 2d 601, 179 N.Y.S.2d 945 (3rd Dep't 1958).
64 31 N.Y.2d at 10, 286 N..2d at 233, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 841. The Court indicated that
the result might have been different if there were a definite and complete agreement and
estoppel elements were present. Several early cases held that a party may be estopped
from invoking the statutory requirement of a writing where his opponent may be
prejudiced or deceived by his reliance upon the oral stipulation. See, e.g., Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. O'Donnell, 146 N.Y. 275, 40 N.E. 787 (1895); People v. Stephens, 52 N.Y. 306
(1873); Zwecker v. Levine, 135 App. Div. 432, 120 N.Y.S. 425 (Ist Dep't 1909); Gass v.
Arons, 131 Misc. 502, 227 N.Y.S. 282 (N.Y. City Ct. Bronx County 1928); Lee v. Rudd,
120 Misc. 407, 198 N.Y.S. 628 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1923).
65 31 N.Y.2d at 10, 286 N.E.2d at 233, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 840-41. The Court further
stated: "It is critical that transactions of this import, and court proceedings in particular,
[Vol. 47:530
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court," the Court did not reach the question of the applicability of
the Statute of Frauds to an oral stipulation.';
While the courts generally favor the resolution of issues by stipu-
lation of the parties, CPLR 2104's requirement that such agreements
be in Writing is intended to insure that courts will not be confronted
constantly with the task of resolving controverted issues of fact which
invariably arise out of oral stipulations. The statute excepts open
court stipulations because they are generally recorded, and the Dolgin
decision recognized that an extension of this exception to informal
conferences would defeat its purpose.
ARTICLE 30- REMEDIES AND PLEADING
CPLR 3015(a): Where plaintiff alleges performance of contractual
conditions precedent, requirement that defendant deny such perfor-
mance with particularity is not applicable.
CPLR 3015(a) provides that the performance or occurrence of
conditions precedent in a contract need not be pleaded. Hence, in
order to raise a triable issue with respect to any such condition, the
defendant must indicate "specifically and with particularity" those con-
ditions which he contends have not been fulfilled.67
In Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Malan Construction
Corp.,68 the plaintiff alleged that certain conditions precedent had
been performed, and the defendant entered a general denial.69 When
the defendant attempted to examine the plaintiff during its pretrial
examination regarding its performance under the contract, it was pre-
cluded by the court from doing so. The Court of Appeals unanimously
not be embroiled in inchoate, unprovable arrangements, in which the court or its officers
play a part." Id. at 11, 286 N.E.2d at 234, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 841.
66 The alleged agreement involved the transfer of land and would ordinarily come
under the purview of General Obligations Law §§ 5-703 and 15-501. However, some
courts have held that such an oral stipulation made in open court is not barred by the
Statute of Frauds. See Anders v. Anders, 6 App. Div. 2d 440, 179 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Ist Dep't
1958); Rudolph v. Cinco, 34 Misc. 2d 1016, 229 N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1962). The Dolgin Court characterized this authority as "sparse but persuasive." 31
N.Y.2d at 8, 286 N.E.2d at 232, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 839.
07 A host of cases illustrate this rule. See, e.g., Lourie v. Mishkin, 279 App. Div. 754,
108 N.Y.S.2d 777 (2d Dep't 1951) (mem.); Arrow Plumbing Co. v. Dare Constr. Corp., 212
N.Y.S.2d 438 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961); Rao v. Katz, 6 Misc. 2d 760, 161 N.Y.S.2d
504 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1957); Koeppel v. Koeppel, 138 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1954); Kapper v. Greenfield, 100 N.Y.S.2d 921 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1948).
These cases construed RCP 92, the predecessor of CPLR 3015(a).
68 30 N.Y.2d 225, 282 N.E.2d 600, 331 N.Y.S.2d 636 (1972).
69 Dean McLaughlin has stated that "the parties charted a middle course between
the common law [which required that the performance or occurrence of all conditions
precedent be pleaded in detail] and the CPLR .... ".New York Trial Practice, 167
N.Y.L.J. 112, June 9, 1972, at 4, col. 3.
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